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THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE TO
TARGETS OF THIRD PARTY SUBPOENAS IN SEC
INVESTIGATIONS-A REMEDY WITHOUT A RIGHT-Jerry
T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, No.
83-751, slip op. (U.S. June 18, 1984).
The threat of civil, criminal, or administrative sanctions is, of course,
the greatest risk faced by a subject of an SEC investigation. However,
regardless of the investigatee's guilt or innocence, an investigation poses
other hazards, especially damage to business reputation. ' SEC investiga-
tees traditionally have had virtually no protection against the economic
risks that accompany the investigative process. 2 These risks have been
seen as the unavoidable cost of pursuing a regulated activity. 3
In Jerry T. O'Brien, In. v. SEC, 4 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit recently attempted to protect investigatees 5 by recognizing a new
right6 to be investigated consistently with the standards of United States
v. Powell.7 The court further held that investigatees must have notice of
I. Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 280, 284
(1974); Lacy, Adverse Publicity and SEC Enforcement Procedure, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 435,
438-40 (1977); Lowenfels, Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations: The Need for Re-
form, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 575, 576 (1971); Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations:
Laying the Foundation for Successful Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative and Criminal
Proceedings, 24 EMORY L.J. 567, 570 n. 11 (1975); see infra Part IA.
2. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 576; see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706
(1982); Rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission Relating to Investigations, 17 C.F.R.
§ 203 (1983) [hereinafter cited as RRII.
3. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442-43 (1960) (any "public opprobrium and scom"
suffered by those subject to investigation does not constitute irreparable harm); Petroleum Explora-
tion, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938) (collateral effects of investigation are
merely " 'part of the social burden of living under government' ") (quoting Bradley Lumber Co. v.
NLRB, 84 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1936)); American Int'l Trading Co. v. Bagley, 536 F.2d 1196,
1198 (7th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973)
(damage to business activities held to be simply a necessary hazard of doing business), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 915 (1975); Stardust, Inc. v. SEC, 225 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1955) (quoting Petroleum
Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938)); Audobon Life Ins. Co. v.
FTC, 543 F. Supp. 1362, 1368 (M.D. La. 1982); International Waste Controls, Inc. v. SEC, 362 F.
Supp. 117, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (even "grievous economic loss" occurring as the result of the
delay inherent in the investigative process held not sufficient harm to warrant enjoining an investiga-
tion), affd, 485 F.2d 1238 (1973).
4. 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, No. 83-751, slip op. (U.S. June 18, 1984).
5. O'Brien was subsequently followed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in a second
case involving similar issues: Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. v. SEC, 714 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1983).
The O'Brien approach was expressly rejected by the federal district court for the Southern District of
New York in PepsiCo, Inc. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828, 831-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), in which the court
dismissed a claim for an injunction which would have required the SEC to give notice to investigatees
of all third party subpoenas.
6. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1068.
7. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). Powell established the requirements for the showing that an agency must
make to obtain enforcement of its subpoenas in a subpoena enforcement proceeding. See infra note
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agency subpoenas served on third parties to enable them to assert their
rights under Powell by attempting to intervene in subpoena enforcement
proceedings. 8
This Note examines generally the economic interests of SEC investiga-
tees and reviews prior judicial treatment of these interests. The Note then
analyzes the O'Brien decision, focusing on the court's avoidance of seri-
ous reviewability questions in its attempt to provide relief for investiga-
tees. The Note concludes that the court's reasoning is fundamentally in-
51. The elements of this showing are referred to by the O'Brien court as the "Powell standards."
O'Brien. 704 F.2d at 1068. The term "standards" may be a misleading description of the elements of
a Powell showing. The purpose of a Powell showing is merely to prove that the agency is entitled to
enforce its subpoenas. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57. Calling the elements of this showing "'standards"
permits the suggestion that Powell set a general standard for judicial review of investigations. In a
subpoena enforcement proceeding under Powell, the most a court may do is refuse to enforce a sub-
poena; it may not enjoin an investigation. Therefore, this Note will use the term "requirements" in
place of "'standards" when referring to Powell.
8. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1069. SEC subpoenas are not self-executing. The recipient may refuse to
comply without penalty. If this occurs, the agency must seek enforcement of the subpoena in federal
district court. Securities Act of 1933, § 22(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b) (1982); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 21(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1982); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 18(d). 15
U.S.C. § 79r(d) (1982): Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 322, 15 U.S.C. 77vvv(b) (1982); Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78bbb (1982). Subpoena enforcement procedure
was detailed in SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118, 128 (3d Cir. 1981). The
agency institutes a subpoena enforcement proceeding by filing a complaint alleging the relevance of
the subpoena to the agency's investigative purpose. It must allege: (1) that the investigation will be
conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose; (2) that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose: (3)
that the information sought is not already within the Commission's possession; and (4) that the ad-
ministrative steps required by the governing statute have been followed. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58.
The agency must also file an accompanying affidavit of the agent who issued the subpoena venfying
these allegations. The subpoenaed party is then served, and a hearing is held. If the court determines
that the Powell requirements are met, it will order compliance. Id. Refusal to comply may result in
sanctions for contempt. Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 591 (1947).
The right of non-subpoenaed parties to challenge agency subpoenas was established in Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964). In Reisman the Court held that a non-subpoenaed party had no standing
to seek an injunction barring the IRS from issuing subpoenas to witnesses in an investigation. In-
stead, the Court held that a non-subpoenaed party, whether the taxpayer or an interested third party,
could intervene and challenge the subpoena in a district court enforcement proceeding. The Court
also established that a non-subpoenaed party may seek an injunction restraining a witness from com-
plying with a subpoena (relief not sought in that case). Id. Such an injunction effectively permits the
non-subpoenaed party to trigger a subpoena enforcement proceeding. See Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 519-20 (1971).
The right of investigatees to intervene in subpoena enforcement proceedings was clarified in an-
other IRS case, Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). The Court in Donaldson held that
intervention in a subpoena enforcement proceeding by a third party was permissive only and not
mandatory. Id. at 529. See generally FED R. Civ P. 24(a)(2) & 81(a)(3). Relying on FED R. Civ P.
24(a)(2), the Donaldson Court affirmed the district court's denial of permission to intervene, holding
that a third party could intervene only if it had a protected interest at stake. Donaldson. 400 U.S. at
531. Intervention is warranted in cases where the summons is directed at documents in the hands of
the subpoenaed party that are subject to an established privilege belonging to the third party, such as
the attorney-client privilege, or where the third party has a proprietary interest in documents held by
the subpoenaed party. Id. at 530.
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correct. Finally, the Note proposes two alternative methods of protecting
the interests that the O'Brien court apparently wished to protect.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Hazards of an SEC Investigation
Merely being made the subject of an SEC investigation may involve
high costs to an investigatee. 9 An investigatee may spend large amounts
of time and money in defending against the investigation and responding
to agency requests for information.10 The investigatee also faces a less
direct but potentially more serious danger-damage to business reputa-
tion."1 To a large extent, the risk of damage to reputation unavoidably
inheres in the statutory enforcement scheme under which the investiga-
tee's business associates are subpoenaed and questioned.12 In addition,
unavoidable damage to reputation can be aggravated by agency abuse of
its investigatory powers. 13 Damage to business reputation is especially
serious in the securities field because the daily operation of the industry
depends on reputation and trust. 14
9. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 576. See generally Freedman, supra note 1; Lacy, supra note 1;
Mathews, supra note 1.
10. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 577-78. An investigation may necessitate the expense of legal
counsel, other expert help, and time away from the investigatee's own business. Id.
11. Freedman, supra note I, at 284; Lacy, supra note 1, at 438-40; Lowenfels, supra note 1, at
576-77; Mathews, supra note 1, at 570-71 n. 11.
12. SEC formal investigations are technically private. Rule 5 of the RRI, supra note 2, states
that, -[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Commission, all formal investigative proceedings shall be
non-public." 17 C.F.R. § 203.5 (1983). However, investigations are often "publicized" by the issu-
ance of administrative subpoenas to third-party witnesses. Lacy, supra note 1, at 438-39; Lowenfels,
supra note 1, at 577; Mathews, supra note 1, at 570-71 n.ll. A witness may readily discover an
investigatee's identity if the investigatee is named in the Formal Order of Investigation, since wit-
nesses have the right to inspect the order under the RRI. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a) (1983). However, even
if the order does not name the investigatee, witnesses are usually able to deduce the party's identity
from questions asked by SEC staffattorneys. Lacy, supra note 1, at 438.
Those subpoenaed are usually people with whom the investigatee does business. Lacy, supra note
1, at 438-39; Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 577; Mathews, supra note 1, at 570-71 n. 11. Thus, the
first persons to learn of the investigation are those with whom the investigatee's reputation is the most
valuable. Merrifield, Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 Bus. LAw. 1583,
1594 (1977). When business associates learn of the investigation, rumors begin and serious damage to
business reputation may ensue. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 577; Mathews, supra note 1, at 570-71
n.ll.
13. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 576-77. See generally Freedman, supra note 1. SEC personnel
may say more to witnesses than is necessary about the investigatee's suspected guilt. Id. at 284. This
has the effect of coercing or persuading witnesses to disclose information. Such conduct exacerbates
damage to reputation if it suggests that the SEC has already determined the guilt of the investigatee.
However, determining what constitutes abuse in a particular case is a difficult and sensitive matter.
See infra Part IV.
14. Lacy, supra note 1, at 435; see also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y.
619
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B. Judicial Response to the Risks ofBeing an SEC Investigatee
Investigatees have received little judicial or legislative relief from the
burdens of investigation. Unless subpoenaed, they have few rights. Nei-
ther the Administrative Procedure Act nor the SEC's own Rules Relating
to Investigations give any significant protections to the subject of an in-
vestigation. 15 Furthermore, the courts have generally refused relief to
parties who complain of harm to business activities suffered as the result
of an investigation. The chief bar to judicial relief is the notion that
agency investigatory practice is not reviewable because it is not "final
agency action" under section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 16
In FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 17 the Supreme Court held
that the FTC's issuance of a complaint was not final agency action and,
therefore, was not judicially reviewable before the end of the administra-
tive adjudication. The Court reasoned that a complaint differs signifi-
cantly from a regulation, which may be subject to preenforcement review;
unlike a regulation, a complaint is not a "definitive statement of posi-
tion," 18 but merely a threshold determination that further inquiry is war-
1968): J. LANDIS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 108 (1938); Freeman, A Private Practitioner's View
of the Development of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 GEO WASH. L. REV 18, 24
(1959). Suspicion may disrupt lines of credit, cause clients to shift to competitors and strain essential.
established business relationships. Mathews, supra note 1, at 570-71 n. II. Moreover, persons sub-
ject to regulation will avoid association with targets of agency suspicions to protect their own reputa-
tions with the agency. Lacy, supra note 1, at 435.
15. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982); RRI, supra note 2, 17
C.F.R. § 203 (1983).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1982). Several cases before 1980 reflected a limited judicial recognition that
investigatees have some protectible interest. For example, one court suggested that review of SEC
investigations was available if it were alleged that the SEC "'plainly exceeded its statutory authority
or threatens irreparable injury in clear violation of an individual's rights." Gellis v. Casey, 338 F.
Supp. 651, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (dicta); see also M.G. Davis & Co. v. Cohen, 369 F.2d 360, 363
(2d Cir. 1966): International Waste Controls, Inc. v. SEC, 362 F. Supp. 117 (1973), affd 485 F.2d
1238 (2d Cir. 1973). The parameters of this exception to nonreviewability remained vague, however,
because in none of these cases did the courts find any reviewable misconduct by the agency. Finally,
in 1980, a federal district court in Montana held that SEC investigatory action was reviewable as
"final agency action" under § 704 of the APA. Ayers v. SEC, 482 F. Supp. 747, 752 (D. Mont.
1980).
In Avers, the plaintiff sought an injunction against an ongoing SEC investigation on the ground that
the agency was improperly using the investigation to harass him. The court enjoined the investigation
and ordered a limited evidentiary hearing to determine whether the SEC's motive for the investigation
was proper. In holding that SEC investigatory action was reviewable, the Avers court relied on the
1979 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 596
F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 232 (1980), in which the court held that a complaint
issued by the FTC in an agency adjudication was reviewable as final agency action under the APA.
After Ayers was decided, the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit's decision in Standard Oil,
thereby overruling Avers as well. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
17. 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
18. Id. at241.
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ranted. Moreover, the Court reasoned that the harm engendered by a
complaint is unlike that produced by a regulation and, therefore, does not
warrant immediate review. The Court described the harm flowing from a
regulation as the direct and immediate effect on daily business that results
from a change in a regulated party's legal rights and responsibilities. It
distinguished the harm to a party from a complaint as merely "the burden
of responding to the charges made against it." 19
If the initiation of an adjudicatory proceeding is not final, then a fortiori
an investigation to determine whether to initiate adjudication is not final.
Like a complaint, a Formal Order of Investigation effects no change in
the legal status of any party. In addition, the harms generally complained
of during investigations arise merely from having to deal with the agency
and are therefore not remediable. Thus, Standard Oil appears to preclude
a judicial remedy for these harms.
If Standard Oil does bar judicial recognition of the burdens that accom-
pany investigations, it is consistent with a long legislative and judicial
tradition that holds the harms suffered by investigatees to be merely part
of the social burden of living under government. 20 Existing authority
holds that damage to business reputation resulting from an investigation is
not legally cognizable. 21
II. THE O'BRIEN DECISION
In Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC,22 the Commission issued a formal
order of investigation, naming Harry F. Magnuson, certain affiliated par-
ties, "and others" as possible participants in activities that may have
been securities violations. 23 The order authorized certain SEC staff attor-
19. Id. at 242. The Court stated that "[alIthough this burden certainly is substantial, it is differ-
ent in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending what heretofore has been considered to be final
agency action." Id.
20. See, e.g., Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 222 (1938);
cases cited supra note 3.
21. See supra note 3. Although an investigation was enjoined on the ground of alleged irrepar-
able damage to the plaintiff's business reputation in Ayers v. SEC, 482 F. Supp. 747 (D. Mont.
1980), Ayers is no longer authoritative. See supra note 16.
22. 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, No. 83-751, slip op. (U.S. June 18, 1984).
23. Id. at 1066. The Formal Order of Investigation directed staff to determine whether the events
described in the order constituted failure to file required statements with the Commission, filing false
and misleading annual reports, proxy statements and ownership statements, or selling of stock in
violation of antifraud provisions of the securities laws. The order stated that the following provisions
of federal securities laws may have been violated: Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5(a), 5(c), 17(a); 15
U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a) (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 13(a), 13(d),
13(g), 14(a), 16(a); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78(d), 78(g), 78n(a), 78p(a) (1982); and Commis-
sion Rules lOb-5, 13a-l, 13d-l, 13d-2, 14a-3, 14a-9, 16a-1; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, .13a-1, .13d-
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neys to subpoena witnesses and documents. Jerry T. O'Brien, a regis-
tered broker-dealer of whom Magnuson was a customer,24 was not named
in the order. Sometime after the commencement of the investigation,
O'Brien learned that he too was considered one of the "others" possibly
engaged in violations.
O'Brien and Magnuson brought an injunctive action, claiming that the
investigation had been improperly initiated and conducted. They sought:
(1) to enjoin the SEC from proceeding further on outstanding agency sub-
poenas against Magnuson; and (2) to enjoin the agency from issuing fu-
ture subpoenas on third party witnesses unless it notified the "targets" 25
of the investigation of the issuance of these subpoenas.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted first that SEC investi-
gatees have the right to seek permissive intervention in subpoena enforce-
ment proceedings. 26 The court reasoned that if investigatees are not aware
that such subpoenas have been issued, they cannot seek to challenge
them. The court expressed concern that if investigatees were unable to
challenge these subpoenas, the subpoenas would often go unchallenged
because subpoenaed witnesses who are not themselves under investiga-
tion often lack the resources or motivation to challenge subpoenas served
on them. Thus, the agency is cloaked from judicial review of the subpoe-
nas and can "circumvent the protections afforded by United States v.
Powell. "27
The court reasoned further that investigatees have standing to challenge
subpoenas served on third parties. 28 The court based standing on the in-
vestigatees' "right to be investigated consistently with the Powell stan-
dards. "29 This new right created by the O'Brien court is apparently
1. .13d-2. .14a-3, .14a-9, 16a-1 (1983). Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at 3 n.6, O'Brien.
24. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at
3. O'Brien.
25. The O'Brien court terms investigatees "targets." The SEC, however, does not use this ter-
minology. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
at 4 n. 11, 16 n.41. O'Brien. The term "target" may be somewhat misleading, since the focus of SEC
investigations is usually, at least initially, on transactions, not individuals. The purpose of the investi-
gation is often to identify parties responsible for unusual market fluctuations. See generally Ferrara,
SEC Division of Trading and Markets: Detection, Investigation and Enforcement of Selected Prac-
tices that Impair Confidence in the Capital Markets, 16 How L.J. 950, 956-61 (1971). Therefore.
this Note will use the term "investigatees" except when quoting the language of the court.
26. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1067. Under Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), and Donaldson
v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971), which established the right of non-subpoenaed parties to
intervene in subpoena enforcement proceedings, the right to intervene extends to any interested third
party, and is not limited to non-subpoenaed targets. See supra note 8.
27. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1068 (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)).
28. ld.
29. Id. at 1069.
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equivalent to a general right to be investigated fairly. 30 In addition, the
court said that subpoenaed parties themselves lack standing to require an
agency to conduct its investigation of another party consistently with
Powell. The court reasoned that, as a result, the investigatees' rights
under Powell would go unprotected unless they were given a chance to
raise a challenge themselves. The court held, therefore, that investigatees
are entitled to notice of third party subpoenas so that they may at least
attempt to intervene in subpoena enforcement proceedings. 31
III. ANALYTICAL FLAWS IN THE COURT'S REASONING
Without any articulated constitutional or statutory justification, the
O'Brien court created an opportunity for judicial review of agency inves-
tigative conduct. As such, the O'Brien result probably reflects judicial
discomfort with unchecked agency power. 32 It is best explained as an ex-
ercise of control over an area of agency activity previously left entirely to
agency discretion.
The court's intervention into this area of agency activity could not be
justified under the traditional doctrine ofjudical review. Instead, the court
converted the subpoena enforcement proceeding, a special, expedited
hearing for vindicating the constitutional rights of a subpoenaed party,
into an opportunity for general review of the investigative conduct of the
agency. 33 In accordance with this scheme, the court required the agency
to notify the investigatees of the issuance of all subpoenas, to insure their
ability to initiate review. 34
The court's treatment of the subpoena enforcement proceeding as an
occasion for general review of the investigation is inconsistent with all
precedent regarding the type of claims that may be brought in such a pro-
ceeding. Furthermore, even if the scope of review in a subpoena enforce-
ment proceeding could be broadened to include general review of an in-
30. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
31. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1068-69.
32. Lacy, supra note 1, at 436-37 (faith in agency expertise unjustified in the context of agency
adverse publicity); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1677-78 (1975) (discusses modem dissatisfaction with broad grants of agency discretion).
33. See infra Part 1IlA.
34. See infra Part I11B. The court apparently assumes that investigatees, if notified of a sub-
poena, could enjoin the subpoenaed party from complying, and thereby force the agency to bring an
enforcement action in which investigatees could intervene and bring a claim for review under Powell.
Under this scheme, investigatees have the power to initiate review indirectly. The court does not
address the question whether investigatees may obtain review of the investigation directly in an in-
junctive action against either the subpoenaed party or the agency. The logic of the opinion suggests
that they may. This consequence of the O'Brien decision reveals that O'Brien is, in effect, an attempt
to "overrule" FTC v. Standard Oil of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980). See supra notes 17-19 and accom-
panying text.
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vestigation, the Powell decision cannot be used as the basis of a claim for
general review because it affords no general right to be investigated
fairly. Finally, the court's notice requirement cannot be justified on due
process grounds because an investigation threatens no interest protected
by the due process clause.
A. The Court's Transformation of the Subpoena Enforcement
Proceeding
Because the agency's investigative conduct in O'Brien was not final
agency action, it should have been unreviewable. 35 The court did not ad-
dress the reviewability problem directly. Instead, it expanded the scope of
review possible in a subpoena enforcement proceeding. Non-subpoenaed
investigatees have traditionally had no standing to assert claims in a sub-
poena enforcement proceeding brought against a third party unless the
subpoena implicated a personal right of the investigatee. 36 The O'Brien
court first lowered the standing barrier to subpoena enforcement proceed-
ings to allow non-subpoenaed investigatees to bring a claim to enforce
agency accountability to the Powell requirements. Once it gave investiga-
tees standing to assert a claim under Powell, it then, without explanation,
leveraged this limited right into an opportunity for general review of the
investigation. It did this by treating the Powell requirements as though
they were a standard for general review of an investigation. The court's
discussion of standing 37 was thus simply a device for avoiding the real
issue before the court-reviewability. 38
1. Standing in Subpoena Enforcement Proceedings and Standing to
Obtain Statutory Review
Standing requirements vary with the type of proceeding to which ac-
cess is sought. A relatively definite and rigorous standing barrier has tra-
ditionally limited the claims that may be brought in a subpoena enforce-
35. See supra Part 1B.
36. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517
(1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969);
Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959).
37. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1068-69.
38. It is ironic that in the first section of the O'Brien opinion, in which the court denied relief
from subpoenas served upon the investigatees, the court expressly recognized the unreviewability of
an agency investigation. In footnote 6 to the opinion, the court stated that "'[d]istrict court review of
the propriety of SEC actions in its investigation would also have been inappropriate because 'final
agency action,' a prerequisite to judicial review, had not yet occurred. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co.
of Cal." (citation omitted). O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1067.
624
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ment proceeding to claims of personal harm to a legal right arising
directly from the issuance of a particular subpoena. 39 The standing barrier
to statutory review40 of final agency action, however, is much lower and
considerably less clear.41 The O'Brien court expanded the scope of re-
view in subpoena enforcement proceedings by substituting the lower stan-
dard used in statutory review of final agency action for the more rigorous
standard traditionally used in subpoena enforcement proceedings.
The prior law of standing to challenge agency subpoenas rested on the
fundamental principle that the subpoena enforcement proceeding exists
solely to insure that the agency does not abuse its subpoena power. 42
Therefore, the proceeding protected only rights directly affected by the
issuance of a particular subpoena. These included limited fourth and fifth
amendment rights and certain established common law privileges includ-
ing the attorney-client privilege and the right to protection of trade se-
crets. 43 Unless a party could claim harm under one of these rubrics,
courts would deny standing in a subpoena enforcement proceeding. 44
39. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
40. In an action for statutory review, the court reviews an agency decision to determine whether
it violates the APA, the agency's enabling legislation, some other statutory provision, or the Consti-
tution. E. GELLHORN & B. BOYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRocEss NUTSHELL 289-90 (1981);
Comment, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U.L. REV.
835,836-37 (1975).
41. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
42. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440
(1964); supra note 8.
43. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S.
440, 442 (1964); see supra note 8.
44. Neither Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), nor Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S.
517 (1971), discussed the investigatee's right to intervene in terms of standing. The investigatee's
rights have been addressed as standing questions in another line of cases including United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978); Harris v. United
States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959). The
rights granting standing have been treated as virtually identical to those sufficient to permit interven-
tion. Investigatees have been denied standing to assert the subpoenaed party's fourth or fifth amend-
ment rights with regard to the subpoena. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d at 318; Foster v. United
States, 265 F.2d at 187-88. It has been held, moreover, that the issuance of a subpoena to a third
party to obtain that party's records does not violate the investigatee's own fourth amendment right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445.
One recent court of appeals decision held that the investigatee had standing at his trial on criminal
charges to attack the validity of an IRS subpoena issued to a third party and to have the fruits of the
subpoena suppressed on the ground that the IRS had improperly issued the subpoena for the purpose
of a criminal proceeding. United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d at 311. But even Genser confined the
investigatee's standing to a challenge involving a particular subpoena.
It should be noted that non-subpoenaed taxpayers can require the IRS to make a Powell showing as
intervenors in subpoena enfdrcement proceedings brought by the IRS to enforce compliance by third-
party recordkeepers solely because of statutory protections afforded the taxpayer-investigatee. Under
the statute at issue in Powell, I.R.C. § 7605 (1982), for example, the taxpayer had the right to be free
from "unnecessary" investigation, and consequently the taxpayer had the right to enforce this provi-
sion. In addition, the Internal Revenue Code contains a statutory notice provision similar to the one
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Fourth and fifth amendment rights cannot usually be asserted by a third
party. 45 Thus, practically speaking, investigatees could not challenge a
subpoena served on a third party unless they could assert either a privilege
or a proprietary interest in the information held by the third party.
Although the O'Brien court concluded that non-subpoenaed investiga-
tees generally have standing to intervene in subpoena enforcement pro-
ceedings, 46 it did not base this conclusion on any right previously recog-
nized as sufficient to grant such standing. Indeed, both the plaintiffs and
the court appeared to be concerned with aspects of the investigation be-
sides the issuance of subpoenas; neither the opinion nor the briefs ex-
pressed any concern that investigatees are prevented from asserting privi-
leges or proprietary rights if they are not notified of subpoenas. 47
Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that the investigation had been improp-
erly initiated and conducted. While this kind of claim has been insuffi-
cient for standing under standard subpoena enforcement rules, it would
not necessarily be insufficient for standing in an action for general statu-
tory review. 4 8 Statutory review of final agency action exists primarily to
created judicially in O'Brien, requiring that the taxpayer be given notice of any subpoena issued to a
"'third-party recordkeeper." I.R.C. § 7609 (1982). The provision allows the noticee to "stand in the
shoes" of the third-party recordkeeper and assert any challenge to the subpoena that the subpoenaed
party could assert. S. REP No 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 370, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CON6 &
AD NEws 2897, 3800. See United States v. Hamilton Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 566 F. Supp. 755
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Thus the protections afforded taxpayer-investigatees are entirely statutory in origin. No similar
statutory protections exist for SEC investigatees. Therefore, SEC investigatees currently may look
only to the Constitution for protection during an investigation.
45. See supra note 44.
46. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1983), rel"d, No. 83-751.
slip op. (U.S. June 18, 1984).
47. This reading is supported by footnote 4 to the O'Brien decision, where the court states its
view that "[tihe possibility of excesses in the conduct of agency investigations may explain why
agency subpoenas are not self-executing but require judicial enforcement when a recipient of a sub-
poena does not voluntarily comply." Id. at 1067 n.4.
48. Standing in the statutory review context addresses the question who is entitled to invoke
judicial scrutiny of the legitimacy of agency actions. A party may initiate judicial review of agency
action only if he has a specific interest in the litigation. The exact nature of this interest, however, is
unsettled. The type and degree of interest necessary to invoke statutory review of agency action has
been the subject of extensive academic debate. Moreover, the Supreme Court has been extremely
inconsistent in its approach to standing. See 4 K. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE 208-348
(1983).
The doctrine has been said to have its roots in the Constitution's article Ill requirement of a case or
controversy as well as in a common law requirement that a plaintiff have suffered harm to a legally-
protected interest. Recent Supreme Court cases have rejected the legally-protected interest test be-
cause of its tendency to involve a preliminary determination of the merits of the claim. This test was
replaced with a two-part test requiring that the plaintiff be "aggrieved" with respect to an interest
"arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question." Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970): see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The zone of interests test was neglected by
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enforce agency accountability to a legislative mandate, not to vindicate
private rights. 49 O'Brien and Magnuson would surely qualify to bring an
action for statutory review of the investigation if that were permitted,
since in the statutory review context, standing addresses merely the ques-
tion whether plaintiffs have a sufficient personal stake in the agency's
action to entitle them to invoke judicial scrutiny of the action. Therefore,
focusing on agency accountability, the court attempted to analyze the
standing issue with standards appropriate for statutory review. That this
was the court's approach is corroborated by its citation to Sierra Club v.
Morton,50 a key decision in the Supreme Court's movement during the
early 1970's to liberalize standing requirements in actions for statutory
review.
Thus, the O'Brien court converted the subpoena enforcement proceed-
ing into an opportunity for general review of an investigation by replacing
the high standing barrier applicable to such proceedings with the lower
standing barrier applicable to statutory review. The right on which the
court based the plaintiffs' standing was not a right previously recognized
in subpoena enforcement proceedings. Instead, it more closely resembles
rights recognized in actions for statutory review.
2. The Court's Use of United States v. Powell
In United States v. Powell, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished the requirements of the showing that an agency must make to ob-
tain enforcement of its subpoenas. 5' In addition to giving investigatees
the Court for a number of years, but has reappeared in some recent decisions. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475
(1982); Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 n.6 (1979); Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977). In addition to these tests, the Court has also held that
there is a need for a causal nexus between the protected interest and the harm suffered to insure that
the harm is not too remote. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
42-43 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
618 (1973). But see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669 (1973).
Some commentators have argued that the doctrine of standing should be dispensed with entirely
since, arguably, all the questions addressed by standing can be better addressed under other headings
such as the law of claims or the doctrines of reviewability, ripeness, mootness and political question.
See, e.g., Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for
Relief, 83 YALE L. J. 425 (1974); Comment, Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.
J. 1665 (1974). Other commentators, notably Kenneth Culp Davis, believe that the only test of stand-
ing should be whether the plaintiff has sustained "injury-in-fact." 4 K. DAvis, supra, at 211-14.
49. See supra note 40.
50. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Sierra Club established that threats to aesthetic, recreational, and envi-
ronmental interests could constitute sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy the standing requirement. Id. at
734.
51. 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In Powell, the IRS sought to enforce compliance with a subpoena issued
627
Washington Law Review Vol. 59:617, 1984
standing to bring claims in a subpoena enforcement proceeding to enforce
the Powell requirements, the O'Brien court also broadened the scope of
review available in a subpoena enforcement proceeding by treating Pow-
ell as though it gave investigatees a fight to be investigated in a particular
way. Thus, in the absence of any statute authorizing general review of an
investigation or any legislatively-prescribed standard for such review, the
O'Brien court manufactured a substitute using the Powell requirements.
Powell requires the agency to show that it is acting within its statutory
mandate to insure that an agency request for information is not unduly
burdensome. 52 In the context of the Powell opinion, the Powell require-
ments clearly afford no general right to a non-subpoenaed investigatee to
be investigated fairly. Nonetheless, if the Powell requirements could be
excised from their context, they would look remarkably similar to the
standards of judicial review used in an action for statutory review, 53 in-
asmuch as they require that the agency has acted within its statutory au-
thorization. The court used the Powell requirements as though they were
a standard for general statutory review. The court apparently reasoned
that the O'Brien plaintiffs had the requisite personal stake in the investi-
to the president of a taxpayer corporation under investigation for tax fraud. The statutes governing the
conduct of IRS investigations, unlike those governing SEC investigations, had specific protections
for taxpayers under investigation. See supra note 44. Section 7605(b) of the Internal Revenue Code,
I.R.C. § 7605(b) (1982), limited the IRS to "only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of account..
. for each taxable year . . . unless the Secretary or his delegate, after investigation, notifies that
taxpayer in writing that an additional inspection is necessary." Powell, 379 U.S. at 53.
In Powell, the taxpayer corporation's returns had been once previously examined, and a three-year
statute of limitations barred assessment of additional deficiencies for those years except in cases
where fraud was suspected. Powell thus contended that before he could be forced to comply with the
subpoena, the IRS had to show some grounds for its belief that a fraud had been committed. The
Court held that "necessity," as used in the statute in question, was not equivalent to probable cause
and that "[r]eading the statutes as we do, the Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable
cause to obtain enforcement of his summons, either before or after the three-year statute of limitations
... has expired. " Id. at 53, 57. Instead, the court articulated four requirements. See supra note 8.
In these requirements, the Powell court was simply interpreting the IRS statute to require the mini-
mum showing mandated by the fourth amendment, as established much earlier in United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950), and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1946). Those cases had established that the fourth amendment protects the subpoenaed party only
from overbreadth and undue burdensomeness in requests for information. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at
652-53; Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 208. Because in Powell the rights in question were those of a
subpoenaed party, the case raised no question of a non-subpoenaed target's rights. Powell simply
reaffirms the standards for subpoena enforcement established in Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt.
See Pickholz, excerpt from Certain Considerations of Counsel Representing Clients with Obligations
Under the Federal Securities Laws Confronted with Other Potential or Real Civil and Criminal Pro-
ceedings, reprinted in N. KAPLAN, P. FRIEDMAN. R. BENNETT & H. TRAINOR. PARALLEL GRAND JURY
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY INVE TIGATIONS 134-35 (1981); Wilson & Matz, excerpt from Obtaining
Evidence for Federal Economic Crime Prosecutions: An Overview and Analysis of Investigative
Methods, reprinted in N. KAPLAN. P. FRIEDMAN. R. BENNETT & H. TRAINOR. supra, at 37.
52. See supra note 8.
53. See supra note 40.
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gation to give them standing. Thus, through suggestion and indirection,
the O'Brien court created an opportunity for judicial review of agency
investigatory practices.
B. The O'Brien Notice Requirement: Equitable Remedy or Procedural
Due Process?
1. Equitable Remedy
The court was ambiguous about the doctrinal basis for the investiga-
tees' right to notice of third party subpoenas. There are two possible theo-
retical bases for the notice requirement. First, it can be seen simply as an
affirmative equitable remedy. Thus viewed, the court's remedy consists
of an injunction against the issuance of subpoenas to third parties in an
investigation unless it notifies the investigatee of the issuance of the sub-
poenas. 54
Though an unusual equitable remedy, the O'Brien court's notice re-
quirement at least superficially resembles commonly used equitable
remedies in actions for statutory review. Such actions frequently use pro-
spective, affirmative equitable remedies. 55 Many times, relief takes the
form of requiring the agency to act affirmatively to implement a policy
interest represented by the plaintiff. These remedies often reflect a quasi-
legislative balancing of competing interests by the court. 56 The O'Brien
notice requirement appears to have all of these characteristics: it is pro-
spective, affirmative, and at least purports to balance agency and investi-
gatee interests.57
If viewed as an equitable remedy, the notice requirement is consistent
with the court's attempt to justify general review of agency investigative
activity. However, if investigative activity is unreviewable, the court has
no jurisdiction to grant a remedy. Therefore, the notice requirement can-
not be upheld as a valid exercise of the court's equitable powers.
54. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, No. 83-751, slip
op. (U.S. June 18, 1984).
55. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96
(1976); Parker& Stone, Standing and Public Law Remedies, 78 COLtUM. L. REv. 771,776-81(1978).
56. Chayes, supra note 55, at 1292-96; Parker & Stone, supra note 55, at 776-81.
57. The court stated that "[niotice to targets of third party subpoenas need not unduly burden the
agency or the courts." O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1069. Balancing is also presumably intended by the
cryptic statement the court made at the end of the opinion. After quoting dictum from Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 447 n.26 (1960), to the effect that the SEC should, out of goodwill, send a
copy of its order of investigation to the investigatee, the court states that -[a]bsent special circum-
stances involving a serious threat to the integrity of the investigation, this rationale should apply as
well to service of agency subpoenas on third parties." O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1069.
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2. Procedural Due Process
If the due process clause requires procedural protections in this case,
then the O'Brien court could have properly granted the investigatees
some procedural protection. Some type of procedural protection might be
required even if the type of review prescribed by the court was inappro-
priate. However, under the current state of procedural due process doc-
trine, the O'Brien court had no basis for the procedural protection it af-
forded the investigatees.
Procedural due process requires an evaluation of the procedural fair-
ness of government action only if the government action implicates a
"life," "liberty," or "property" interest. 58 The due process clause ap-
plies only to certain interests derived from some source other than the due
process clause, such as state law. 59 There is no "free standing" 6 sub-
stantive right to procedural fairness in one's dealings with the government
apart from a separate, recognized liberty or property interest. 61 Thus, the
first step in analyzing O'Brien as a due process decision is to identify
possible protected liberty or property interests.
Notably ambiguous about protected interests, the language of the opin-
ion seems to indicate that one of two interests may underlie the notice
requirement. The court stated that "denying the target notice of agency
process issued to third parties necessarily denies the target the ability to
assert its right to be investigated consistently with Powell. "62 A literal
reading of this statement suggests, first, that the court may be basing a
right to notice on the investigatee's right to participate in a subpoena en-
forcement proceeding. Second, the court may intend that the investiga-
tee's rights that underlie the grant of standing entitle him to due process
protections.
If the right to notice arises from the first basis, the court is, in effect,
saying that notice of third party subpoenas is required as a procedural
protection of a procedural protection. However, the due process clause
does not contain an "extra" clause to the effect that no person shall be
deprived of "life, liberty or property, or of due process of law, without
due process of law." 63 Current procedural due process doctrine does not
58. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
59. Seeid. at 577.
60. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administra-
tive State, 62 CORNELL L. REV 445, 452, 455 (1977).
61. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The
Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV 69, 75-88 (1982).
62. O'Brien, 704 F.2d at 1069.
63. Van Alstyne, supra note 60, at 451.
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give the investigatee a protected interest in a particular procedural right
unless that right is supported by a protected interest.
Any rights that the investigatee may have under Powell are also unsa-
tisfactory as a basis for procedural protection. Even if the investigatee's
interests are sufficient to permit him to bring an action to challenge the
agency's compliance with the Powell requirements, that does not neces-
sarily mean they are sufficient to require any particular procedure to be
followed. Interests protected by procedural due process are not cotermi-
nous with those that confer standing to obtain statutory review. 64 As pre-
viously noted, 65 an interest sufficient to confer standing in an action for
statutory review need not be a "legally-protected interest," much less a
constitutionally protected one. A party must simply have a specific inter-
est in the litigation.
Therefore, interests sufficient to confer standing do not necessarily re-
quire procedural protection under the due process clause. If the O'Brien
court intended that Powell serve only as a standard for statutory review,
and if the investigatee's interest was a mere "public" interest in agency
compliance with Powell, his interest does not rise to the level of a consti-
tutionally protected liberty or property interest and does not qualify for
due process protection. 66 Thus, there is no adequate basis for a due pro-
cess right to notice of subpoenas issued to third parties.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE O'BRIEN APPROACH
The court in O'Brien thus created an occasion for judicial review of
agency investigative conduct that is not tied to any constitutional or statu-
tory provision. The decision can be explained only as a judicial effort to
remedy a serious harm which was irremediable under orthodox adminis-
trative law. The O'Brien decision implicitly recognized that investigatees
have an interest worthy of judicial protection. But in granting judicial
protection prior to agency final action, the O'Brien decision conflicts with
FTC v. Standard Oil of California.67
Moreover, the right to notice of subpoenas is unsatisfactory for both
the investigatee and the agency, even if sound policy requires minimizing
64. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 408 (1977); Smolla,
supra note 61, at 74.
65. See supra note 48.
66. The O'Brien court does not suggest that the real interest at stake-reputation-was the basis
for due process protections. This option was foreclosed by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976),
which held that reputation was not a liberty or property interest protected under the due process
clause.
67. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980). See notes 17-19 and accompanying
text.
Washington Law Review
the burden on investigatees. Notice of third party subpoenas fails to ad-
dress the investigatee's chief concern with regard to subpoenas--damage
to business reputation. As long as subpoenas are issued, damage to repu-
tation will continue. From the agency's point of view, notice of third
party subpoenas will inevitably delay investigations, as the agency must
go to court more frequently to enforce its subpoenas. 68 Furthermore,
these difficulties would, to some degree, accompany any attempt to en-
force agency accountability during an investigation by judicial review. 69
Limitations on agency discretion in the investigatory context must there-
fore come either from Congress or from the agency itself, not from the
courts.
Promulgation of standards for initiating an investigation offers the most
effective legislative or administrative solution. 70 It is unlikely that any-
thing can be done administratively or legislatively to minimize the burden
on an investigatee because most risks faced by an investigatee are the
unavoidable concomitant of the statutory enforcement scheme. One com-
mentator has stated that the initiation of an investigation is itself a sanc-
tion on the investigatee. 71 Therefore, the most effective efforts will be
those directed at carefully selecting investigatees in order to minimize the
burden on innocent parties.
Reputation damage resulting from agency misconduct should be distin-
guished from unavoidable damage associated with the statuto'y enforce-
ment scheme. Although agency investigative misconduct is not subject to
statutory review, 72 it need not be irremediable. At the same time, review
of agency misconduct should not be allowed to interfere unnecessarily
with the proper functioning of the agency. The O'Brien court's remedy is
objectionable on this ground, since general review of an investigation in a
subpoena enforcement proceeding would necessarily delay and interrupt
the investigation.
A defamation action for damages against the federal government would
provide a remedy for investigatees without interfering with agency func-
tions. A tort claim would not suspend the investigative process because,
unlike prophylactic equitable remedies used in actions for judicial review,
68. Legal Times. June 6, 1983, at 2, col. 1; Legal Times, Aug. 22, 1983, at I, col. 2; 15 SEC
REG & L. REP. (BNA) No. 36, at 1737 (Sept. 16, 1983): see also PepsiCo Inc. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp.
828, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
69. Harm to reputation and the cost of defending against an investigation could be minimized by
allowing review of a decision to investigate before any subpoenas had actually been issued. How-
ever, this approach to protecting the investigatee's interests would seriously impede the agency's
efforts to investigate in a timely and effective manner.
70. Lacy, supra note 1, at 439-41; Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 579-82.
71. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 576.
72. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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damages are retrospective and compensatory. 73 Moreover, a defamation
action would directly address the harm suffered by the investigatee.
While damage to reputation resulting from agency misconduct is proba-
bly not effectively preventable, it is compensable; damages are perhaps
the only meaningful remedy for harm to reputation caused by agency mis-
conduct.
But while a defamation action is the appropriate remedy for the investi-
gatee's harm, defamation actions against the federal government are cur-
rently barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act.74 The Federal Tort Claims
Act should, therefore, be amended to allow defamation actions against
the government when an investigatee can show actual damage to reputa-
tion resulting from agency misconduct. 75
The significant problem in a tort action for investigative misconduct
involves proof of agency abuse. In many cases it may be extremely diffi-
cult to draw a line between improper statements and statements that were
necessary to acquire essential information. Nonetheless, this difficulty
should not be allowed to preclude the defamation remedy and thereby
shield an agency from any accountability for its investigative practices.
Moreover, the law of defamation, like other areas of tort law, lends itself
to the drawing of difficult lines by a trier of fact working with flexible
verbal formulas.
Any balancing which is necessary to the line-drawing process can be
achieved through the concept of privilege. A privilege should be extended
to statements proved by the agency to be necessary for the acquisition of
information. In addition, the investigatee should bear the burden of prov-
ing not only the usual elements of a defamation claim, but also that
73. Chayes, supra note 55, at 1292-96.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. 1976). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FICA) currently bars suits
against the federal government for "libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights." Id.
75. A number of writers have supported the elimination of the bar to defamation actions against
the government. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 467-71 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 256 (1965); Boger, Gitenstein, & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims
Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C.L. REv. 497, 542 (1976);
Gellhom, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380, 1437-40 (1973).
These include both those who favor the complete abrogation of federal tort immunity and those con-
cerned specifically with the problems of agency publicity. In particular, an amendment of the FTCA
allowing defamation actions was proposed in 1973 by Ernest Gellhorn, who was concerned with the
rights of parties injured by adverse agency publicity issued either to inform and warn the public or to
sanction unlawful conduct. Gellhorn, supra. Gellhorn wrote at that time that agency investigatory
activity should continue to be absolutely privileged, but that the immunity should "extend to accurate
and not excessive descriptions of such agency proceedings." Id. at 1439 n.245. Such an amendment
should not open the floodgates to nuisance suits against the agency. Experience with the FTCA, since
its enactment in 1946, has shown that courts can and do discourage frivolous litigation and limit
damage awards to reasonable amounts. Id. at 1437.
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agency communications were untrue and that he has suffered actual dam-
ages. A defamation action along these lines would provide a mechanism
for determining when the social cost of regulation is excessive.
V. CONCLUSION
The O'Brien decision reflects a policy judgment by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit that the subjects of SEC investigations deserve
protection against the heavy burdens that inevitably fall on them. In re-
sponse to this felt need, the court created an opportunity for judicial re-
view of agency investigative conduct by converting the subpoena en-
forcement proceeding into an occasion for general review of the
investigation. The court's remedy is fundamentally mistaken, because
agency investigative conduct is not "final agency action" and, therefore,
is not reviewable. Instead of judicial review, the proper remedy for the
harm inevitably caused by an investigation is the legislative or adjudica-
tive promulgation of standards for the initiation of investigations. For
harm resulting from defamatory conduct by agency personnel, the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act should be amended to allow defamation actions
against the federal government.
Judith Bellamy Peck
Author's Note-The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., No. 83-751, slip op. (U.S. June
18, 1984), one week before this Note went to press. Justice Marshall's
opinion for a unanimous Court held that the SEC is not required to notify
"targets" of non-public investigations when the agency issues subpoenas
to third parties. Although the Court's result is surely correct, the decision
is unsatisfying for two reasons. First, the Court was unnecessarily am-
biguous about whether investigatees have substantive or procedural
rights with regard to third party subpoenas. If investigatees have such
rights, it is inappropriate for the Court to run roughshod over them, hold-
ing in essence that it is inconvenient to provide a remedy. Second, the
decision fails to acknowledge that investigatees do have serious unpro-
tected interests at stake in investigations. The Court's result, however,
underscores the conclusion of this Note, that relief for investigatees' le-
gitimate interests in business reputation must come from Congress, not
the courts.
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